Šta da (u)rade SAD na Zapadnom Balkanu?!
Američki senator BEN CARDIN 10. januara 2018. predstavio je na konferenicji u Washingtonu prvu celovitu i sveobuhvatnu studiju američkih vlasti ‘’O uticajima Putinovog asimetričnog napada na demokratiju u Rusiji i Evropi na bezbednost SAD’’ koja će biti prosledjena Odboru Američkog kongresa za spoljnu politiku na dalji postupak.
U ovom obimnom dokumentu, knjizi od blizu 200 stranica nekoliko stranica posvećeno je i, kako se navodi ‘’ruskom malignom uticaju u Republici Srbiji’’ iz kojeg u radnom prevodu prenosimo razmišljanja o mogućem američkom odgovoru na njega koji je naslovljen kao:
(ili Šta da se radi)*
Neophodno je više domaćeg liderstva u odbrani od uplitanja Kremlja
Srbija je, imajući u vidu njen centralni geografski položaj i njenu nedavnu komplikovanu istoriju tokom raspada Jugoslavije, važna zemlja za region. Nema sumnje da je navigacija njenog rukovodstva kroz komplikovano političko okruženje, suočena sa pritiscima zbog pokušaja da se „sedi na dve stolice“.
Pitanje liderstva je, međutim, važno; otud ako Srbija želi da se pridružio EU, onda ona mora da preduzme korake kojima će parirati asimetričnom arsenalu Rusije. U nedostatku neke značajnije odbrane, ruska propaganda će nastaviti da utiče na javno mnjenje u Srbiji.
SAD moraju ponovo angažovati svoje resurse
Američka pomoć Srbiji je poslednjih godina u silaznoj putanji. Prema podacima Istraživačke službe Kongresa, SAD su u fiskalnoj 2014. godini pružile pomoć od 22.9 miliona dolara, 14.2 miliona u fiskalnoj 2015. i 16.8 miliona u fisklanoj 2016. Za fiskalnu 2017. godinu Obamina administacija je tražila približno 23 miliona. U budžetu za 2018. godinu Trumpova administracija je tražila 12.1 miliona.497
Polazeći od značajnog povećvanja pomoći odobrenog na osnovu Zakona o suprostavljanju američkim protivnicima putem sankcija iz 2017, USAID misije širom regiona moraju da se preorijentišu na robustnije napore ka smanjivanju malignog ruskog uticaja.498 Ove misije su već godinama su bile na putu smanjivanja obima svojih operacija uz nedovoljan fokus na pretnju koju predstavlja ruski uticaj. Pretnja sa kojom se SAD i njeni saveznici na Balkanu i širom Evrope suočavaju iziskuje reorijentaciju i pomoć.
U svom pristupu ovoj stvarnosti SAD moraju da promene način razmišljanja koji se bavio smanjivanjem nihove vidljivosti i umesto toga da rade na ekspanzionističkom i preduzetničkom pristupu koji pravi dugoročne investicije u podstrekivanju otpornosti i jačanja demokratskih institucija, uključujući tu i njihovu sposobnost da se bore sa dezinformacijama. Sjedinjene Države bi takođe trebalo da nastave da podržavaju napore Srbije da postane više energetski nezavisna, kao i da radi sa EU na sveobuhvatnim planovima za region.
Američki zvaničnici moraju biti vidljiviji:
Pored pomoći, u zemljama poput Srbije neophodan je i viši i konzistentniji diplomatski angažman SAD. Sjedinjene Države moraju da pošalju jasnu poruku da su voljne da ulože vreme i trud neophodan za podršku onima koji žele demokratsku budućnost u Evropi.
Fokus političkog vrha SAD je značajno opao nakon pada Slobodana Miloševića pre više od 17 godina. U oštrom kontrastu sa time se nalazi politička aktivnost Rusije. Predsednik Vučić se sreo sa predsednikom Putinom najmanje dvanaest puta od 2012. godine. 499 Poslednji američki predsednik koji je posetio Beograd bio je Džimi Karter 1980. godine.500
Kako bi popunili ovu prazninu, viši zvaničnici SAD, uključujući tu i članove Kongresa, trebalo bi češće da putuju u region i da primaju primaju u goste visoko pozicionirane zvaničnike u Vašingtonu.
SAD moraju da pošalju jasnu poruku da su se vratile i da su spremne za ozbiljan rad i saradnju sa zemljama domaćinima i saveznicima širom Evrope na odbrani od malignih uticaja i da pomogne zemljama da okončaju integracione procese.
* naslov, podnaslov i bold, FBD
Integralni deo teksta o Srbiji (bold i italic FBD)
Russian malign influence in the Republic of Serbia manifests itself through cultural ties, propaganda, energy, and an expanding defense relationship. Moscow also highlights deep roots between the countries through the Orthodox Church and a shared Slavic culture. This narrative has been carefully cultivated over the years such that Russian government disinformation campaigns find very fertile ground among the population of Serbia.456 Despite its close relationship with Moscow, the government of Serbia has made clear that its top priority is joining the European Union. Serbia’s desire to maintain good relations with both the EU and Russia is reflective of public opinion, but may not be sustainable, as deeper integration may mean adopting EU decisions that run counter to Russian interests.457 Therefore, closer ties between Serbia and the EU could result in a significant surge in Russian malign influence in the country. The government of Serbia has done little to prepare for this eventuality and has taken few discernable actions to defend against Russian malign influence.
Serbian government officials’ differing opinions on EU integration reflect a tension within the broader society itself. In remarks at the Serbian Economic Summit in Belgrade in October 2017, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Brian Yee said that those countries who wished to join the European Union ‘‘must very clearly demonstrate this desire.’’ Referring to Serbia’s long-standing relationship with Moscow, he said, ‘‘You cannot sit on two chairs at the same time, especially if they are that far away.’’458 The mixed reaction from the Serbian government to Yee’s remarks reflected the point that Yee was trying to make. Tanja Miscevic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiator on Serbia’s EU Accession bid, said that Yee’s statement was taken out of context and that he understood that Serbia’s ‘‘clear foreign political strategic orientation’’ was towards the EU.459 Serbia’s Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin, on the other hand, lashed out and said, ‘‘This is not a statement made by a friend or a man respecting Serbia, our policy, and our right to make our own decisions.’’ He also said that Serbia will choose its course regardless of what the ‘‘great powers’’ want.460 Serbia has made significant progress in talks with the EU, having opened 12 out of the 35 ‘‘chapters’’ required for EU membership.461 It also has the closest ties to Russia of any of the prospective candidates. And as it continues to make progress towards integration with Europe, there are signs that Moscow plans to increase pressure on the Balkan country to prevent this outcome. As Serbia’s EU bid becomes more serious, Belgrade would be well served to examine the tools used by Russia laid out throughout this report and work closely with the EU to build its defenses.
The government of the Republic of Serbia has dedicated substantial resources and political capital towards joining the EU.462 But unfortunately, it has taken little action to defend itself from antiEU Russian government propaganda that circulates throughout the country with little resistance. According to the U.S. State Department, the ‘‘number of media outlets and NGOs taking pro-Russian stands has grown from a dozen to over a hundred in recent years, and the free content offered by Russian state outlets such as Sputnik make them the most quoted foreign sources in the Serbian press.’’ 463 For example, Sputnik articles in recent years have falsely claimed that Kosovar Albanians planned pogroms against Kosovar Serbs with the blessing of the West and that the West is fomenting instability in the Balkans to create a pretext for invasion.464 This propaganda appears to have had an impact. Since Sputnik was launched in Serbia in January 2015, Russia’s favorability numbers among Serbians have increased from 47.8 percent to 60 percent in June 2017.465
Most EU aspirants adopt the foreign policy directives of the European Union as a way to show commitment to solidarity even before they join. For example, Montenegro has adopted a top foreign policy priority of the EU—the sanctions regime on Russia—even though it is not a member. Once in the EU, countries are expected to adopt the foreign policies of the block on agreed-upon issues. Serbia has not signed onto the EU’s Russia sanctions, and, given its relationship with Russia, it is difficult to see Belgrade agreeing to such measures in the foreseeable future. This tension with the EU on a central foreign policy priority for Brussels makes a challenging situation for Serbia even more difficult.
A similar dynamic is playing out next door in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where parts of the government have expressed a desire to join NATO.466 In order to move forward, however, all three constituent ethnicities represented in the Bosnian presidency—the Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs—would have to agree on Bosnia’s NATO bid and make the commensurate reforms. Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (RS), or Serbian Republic, is one of two largely autonomous constitutional entities in Bosnia. It is majority Serb and maintains close relations with Moscow. An RS objection to joining NATO would collapse any deal. Although the central government in Sarajevo has expressed support for Bosnia’s implementation of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), the parliament in RS passed a non-binding resolution in October 2017 opposing Bosnia’s potential membership in the military alliance.467 In recent years, Russia has intensified its relationship with RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, which could prove useful in hampering Bosnia’s NATO bid. Though Dodik is not the head of Bosnia’s government, Vladimir Putin has met with him on multiple occasions, despite not meeting the central government in Sarajevo—a breach of diplomatic protocol that makes clear that he is Russia’s preferred interlocutor.468 The Russian government has also publicly expressed its support for a 2017 independence referendum in RS, which the Constitutional Court found violated the rights of nonSerbs in the country.469 If Bosnia were to make significant progress towards NATO, Russia could exert influence in RS to hamper forward progress. The media space is already prepared for that possibility, as RS media outlets rely on anti-NATO and anti-EU content from Sputnik’s Belgrade outlet.470 Russian influence in Banja Luka, the de facto capital of RS, is pervasive—downtown kiosks are filled with t-shirts, coffee mugs, and other memorabilia praising the Russian Federation and Vladimir Putin.471
As Serbia continues to work through chapters in its EU accession talks, Russia has employed several of the interference tools seen in this report, especially propaganda and disinformation. For example, according to Stratfor Worldview, the Russian state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta prints Nedeljnik, a widely read weekly magazine, in Moscow before delivering it to Serbia.472 According to the Financial Times, Sputnik provides online stories and news bulletins to 20 radio stations across Serbia free of charge.473 More than 100 media outlets and NGOs in Serbia can be considered proRussian, a number that has spiked considerably in recent years.474 The response from the West has been sparse, but there are signs of competition in the information space. The BBC has announced plans to reengage in Serbia in 2018, seven years after it closed its Serbian language service. The service will be funded at around £600,000 annually and will employ 20 local staff.475 Press freedom has also declined sharply in recent years in Serbia. Freedom House reported in 2017 that ‘‘press freedom has eroded under the SNS-led administration of Prime Minister [now President] Vucic. Independent and investigative journalists face frequent harassment, including by government officials and in progovernment media. Physical attacks against journalists take place each year, and death threats and other intimidation targeting media workers are a serious concern.’’ 476 If Serbia’s journalists are not able to conduct investigations without threat of censorship, violence, or intimidation, the ability of the country to significantly counter Russian propaganda may not be possible. The government of Serbia has an important role to play in fostering an environment where press freedom can thrive.
Russia also exerts considerable influence through Serbia’s energy sector. In 2014, Russia provided 40 percent of the natural gas consumed in Serbia, and, in December 2017, Serbia’s state-owned natural gas company, Srbijagas, announced that it would increase imports from Gazprom by 33 percent in 2018.477 Russia’s energy dominance also extends to Serbia’s domestic oil, where Gazprom has majority ownership of the national oil company.478 While the cancellation of the South Stream project (see Chapter 4) caught Serbia and other countries in the region by surprise, there are indications that Serbia could be invited to participate in its replacement, Turkish Stream, Russia’s proposed pipeline deal with Turkey.479 While the EU and United States are working with Belgrade to diversify its energy resources through projects like the BulgariaSerbia Interconnector, Serbia’s viable short-term diversification options remain limited.480
Russia is able to engage with the citizens of Serbia through cultural institutions, including the Orthodox Church, civil society associations, and under the guise of humanitarian assistance. Leonid Reshetnikov, a retired lieutenant general in the Russian intelligence service SVR and then director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, spoke at a 2015 conference in Serbia entitled ‘‘Balkan Dialogue—Russia’s Soft Power in Serbia.’’ Reshetnikov has been described by former senior government officials in the Balkans as ‘‘a propaganda fist’’ and ‘‘the right hand of Mr. Putin’’ in their countries.481 He commented on the roots of the orthodox bond between Serbia and Russia:
[W]e have forgotten that we are a civilization that is an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon civilization. Our mission is to carry our civilization into the world and to propose our view. Our soft power is to be loyal to the principles of the Orthodox civilization. That is the idea we should have in mind when we talk about the influence of Russia. Why do Serbs and Russians so easily find a common language? Because we have the same root, we easily find a common language with the Serbs.482
A core element of the Russian government narrative on its relationship with Serbia rests on its common heritage in the Orthodox Church. Church leadership in Russia and Serbia amplify traditional conservative messages that frequently carry anti-EU or antiwestern tones, often focused on gay rights. These ties between the churches are cultivated by senior political leaders—Russian officials emphasize these ties on visits to Serbia, often making time to meet with Serbian Orthodox Church leaders.483
The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS) has documented 51 pro-Kremlin associations and student organizations active in Serbia.484 Among the most influential, according to CEAS, is SNP Nashi, a group modeled on the Russian pro-Kremlin youth organization Nashi (see Chapter 2).485 SNP Nashi was created in 2006 and sought to build closer ties with Moscow, while opposing Serbia’s membership in the EU. The group’s leadership has led efforts against pro-western voices in Serbia and has been sued for creating a list of ‘‘the 30 biggest Serb haters.’’486 Similar organizations include the Patriotic Front, which has reportedly facilitated paramilitary training for Serbian children in Siberia, and the Serbian Patriotic Movement Zavetnici, which includes many student members and has advocated against Kosovo independence as well as Serbia’s proposed EU membership.487 In the southern city of Nis, the Russian government established a Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center (RSHC) in 2012, ostensibly to help Serbia improve its emergency response capabilities and respond to natural disasters.488 U.S. officials, however, have questioned the center’s true purpose. The former Commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges noted his skepticism about Russian intentions in Nis, which is close to U.S. military personnel stationed across the border in Kosovo, saying, ‘‘I don‘t believe it’s a humanitarian center. That’s the facade, but that’s not what it’s for.’’ 489 In June 2017, testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yee stressed that if Serbia ‘‘allows Russia to create some kind of a special center for espionage or other nefarious activities, it will lose control over part of its territory.’’ 490 The Russian government has requested diplomatic status for their staff at the facility, a request that Serbia has not yet honored.
Security cooperation presents Russia with another powerful inroad into Serbia’s government and society. The narrative that Russia is Serbia’s protector on the world stage has a particular resonance with Serbia’s population. A 2017 public opinion survey by the Belgrade-based Demostat research center found that 41 percent perceive Russia as Serbia’s greatest friend.491 The Russian government takes a hard line against recognition of Kosovo’s statehood and blocking resolutions at the UN on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic frequently meets with President Putin, and as recently as December 2017 called upon Russia to play a more active role in negotiations on Serbia’s relationship with Kosovo.492
This theme also plays out in the defense relationship between Russia and Serbia. In the last year, Serbia signed a major arms deal with Russia and sent a member of its Defense Attache´ team in Moscow to observe a Russian military exercise in Crimea.493 In October 2017, Russia provided six MiG-29 jets, and reportedly agreed to provide 30 T-72 tanks and 30 BRDM-2 patrol combat vehicles to Serbia, all at no charge. President Vucic reportedly said that Serbia is also negotiating the purchase of the S-300 air defense system from Russia, a deal which could trigger recently adopted U.S. law which mandates sanctions on any significant transaction with the Russian military or intelligence sectors.494
Despite close military ties with Russia, Serbia also seeks to maintain security cooperation with NATO and the United States. According to the Congressional Research Service, Serbia participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, including through joint exercises and training opportunities.495 According to John Cappello, a former Acting Defense Attache´ at the U.S. Embassy, Serbia held around 125 military-to-military exchanges with the United States in 2016, compared to only four with Russia.496
The Russian government’s asymmetric arsenal in Serbia is multifaceted and very effective at maintaining public support for a strong relationship with Moscow. This has been achieved with little counter-messaging efforts on the part of the European Union and the United States. Given Serbia’s central role and influence in the Balkans, any strategy to counter malign influence should start with Belgrade. Since the Russian government could significantly ramp up its malign influence efforts beyond current levels in the event that Serbia made clear strides towards joining the European Union, the international community should prepare for this eventuality by incorporating some of the best lessons learned from other countries across Europe.
• More Domestic Leadership is Needed to Defend Against Kremlin Interference: Serbia is an important country in the region, given its geographical centrality and complicated recent history during the breakup of Yugoslavia. As its leaders navigate a challenging political environment, there is no doubt that Serbia faces pressure in trying to ‘’sit on two chairs.’’ But leadership matters, and if Serbia wants to join the EU, it needs to take steps to counter the Russian asymmetric arsenal. Without any significant defense, Russian propaganda will continue to have an impact on public opinion in Serbia.
• The United States Must Reengage with Resources: U.S. assistance to Serbia has been on a downward trajectory in recent years. According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States provided $22.9 million in FY2014, $14.2 million in FY2015, and $16.8 million in FY2016. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested approximately $23 million. The FY2018 budget from the Trump Administration requested $12.1 million.497 In light of substantial assistance increases authorized in the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, USAID missions across the region must reorient towards a more robust effort to counter Russian malign influence.498 For years, these missions have been on a glide path to wind down operations with insufficient focus on the threat posed by Russian malign influence. The challenge faced by the United States and its allies across the Balkans and throughout Europe requires a reorientation of assistance. In approaching this reality, the United States must reverse years of thinking about shrinking its footprint, and instead work towards an expansive and entrepreneurial approach that makes long-term investments in building resiliency and strengthening democratic institutions, including their ability to counter disinformation. The United States should also continue to support Serbia’s efforts to become more energy independent, and work with the EU on comprehensive efforts across the region.
• U.S. Officials Need to Show Up: In addition to aid, countries like Serbia also need senior level and consistent U.S. diplomatic engagement. The United States must send a clear message that it is willing to spend the time and effort necessary to support those who want a democratic future in Europe. High-level attention by the United States has been noticeably diminished in the region since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, more than 17 years ago. Russian engagement with Serbia’s leadership stands in stark contrast to that of the United States. President Vucic has met with President Putin at least twelve times since 2012.499 The last U.S. President to visit Belgrade was Jimmy Carter in 1980.500 To fill this void, senior U.S. officials, including members of Congress, should regularly travel to the region and host high profile visitors to Washington. The United States needs to send a clear message that it is back and ready to work seriously in cooperation with host countries and allies across Europe to defend against malign influence and help countries complete the integration process.
456 Forty-two percent of Serbian citizens see Russia as Serbia’s most supportive partner, compared to 14 percent for the EU and 12 percent for China. Public Opinion Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept. 2017 (unpublished).
457While 49 percent of Serbian citizens supported joining the EU in September 2017, that number drops to only 28 percemt if joining the EU meant ‘’spoiling Serbia’s relationship with Russia.’’ Public Opinion Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept. 2017 (unpublished).
458 ‘‘Serbian Defense Minister Denounces U.S. Official’s ‘Unfriendly‘ Remarks,’’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, Oct. 24, 2017.
461 ‘‘EU Opens New Negotiation Chapters With Montenegro, Serbia,’’ Radio Free Europe/ Radio Free Liberty, Dec. 11, 2017.
462See, e.g., Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU Integration Process of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/themes/public-consultation-on-the-eu-strategy-for-theadriatic-and-ionian-region (visited Dec. 19, 2017).
463 U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Serbia provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
464 Andrew Rettman, ‘‘Western Balkans: EU Blindspot on Russian Propaganda,’’ EUobserver, December 10, 2015. 465Public Opinion Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept. 2017 (unpublished).
466 ‘‘Bosnia Making Military Progress in NATO Bid—Alliance General,’’ Reuters, Nov. 14, 2017.
467 ‘‘Bosnian Serbs Pass Non-Binding Resolution against NATO Membership,’’ Associated Press, Oct. 18, 2017.
468 Danijel Kovacevic, ‘‘Putin-Dodik Comradeship Causes Uncertainty for Bosnia,’’ BIRN/Balkan Insight, June 8, 2017.
469Milivoje Pantovic et al., ‘‘Russia Lends Full Backing to Bosnian Serb Referendum,’’ Balkan Insight, Sept. 20, 2016.
470 John Cappello, ‘‘Russian Information Operations in the Western Balkans,’’ Real Clear Defense, Feb. 1, 2017. 471Observed during Committee Staff Visit to Banja Luka, July 2017.
472 ‘‘Russia Stirs up the Hornet’s Nest,’’ Stratfor Worldview, Mar. 28, 2017.
473 Andrew Byrne, ‘‘Kremlin Backed Media Adds to Western Fears in Balkans’’ Financial Times, March 19, 2017. In conversations with U.S. officials and civil society groups during a visit to Belgrade in 2017, Committee staff were told Serbian outlets pick up content from Sputnik and other Russian outlets because it is free; however, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also provides free content that is objective and does not contain the same Russian propaganda messages.
474 .U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017. 475 Ibid.
476 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017: Serbia (2017).
477 Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, ‘‘Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks,’’ The Jamestown Foundation, June 2016, at 242; ‘‘Gazprom to Increase by 33% Natgas Exports to Serbia in 2018,’’ SeeNews, Dec. 20, 2017.
478 U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
479 Andrew Roth, ‘‘In Diplomatic Defeat, Putin Diverts Pipeline to Turkey,’’ The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2014; Vincent L. Morelli, ‘‘Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ Congressional Research Service, Oct. 16, 2017.
480 In January 2017, Serbia and Bulgaria signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a natural gas line between the cities of Sofia and Nis, contributing to regional efforts to diversify energy supplies away from Moscow. ‘‘Bulgaria, Serbia Agree to Work on Pipeline to Cut Reliance on Russian Gas,’’ Reuters, Jan. 19, 2017.
481 Joe Parkinson & Georgi Kantchev, ‘‘Document: Russia Uses Rigged Polls, Fake News to Sway Foreign Elections,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 23, 2017. In addition, Reshetnikov was sanctioned by the United States in December 2016 for his role in a bank that financed the government of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Ibid.
482The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Eyes Wide Shut: Strengthening of Russian Soft Power in Serbia: Goals, Instruments, and Effects, May 2016 (citing ‘‘Soft Power’’ of Russia in Serbia—Possibilities and Perspectives, NSPM [Nova Srpska Politicka Misao], Dec. 15, 2014 (in Serbian)).483See Ibid. at 71-73.
484 Ibid. at 82-99.
485 Ibid. at 84. For more on Nashi, see Chapter 2.
487 Ibid. at 88-89. 488 Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center, ‘‘About,’’ http://en.ihc.rs/about (visited Dec. 19, 2017). 489 ‘‘US General: Russian Center in Serbia is Not Humanitarian,’’ In Serbia Today, Nov. 16, 2017. Lt. Gen. Hodges retired in December 2017.
490Statement of Hoyt Brian Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Southeast Europe: Strengthening Democracy and Countering Malign Foreign Influence, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 14, 2017
491Filip Rudic, ‘‘Serbians Support Military Neutrality, Research Says,’’ Balkan Insight, Sept. 5, 2017.
492Filip Rudic, ‘‘Serbia Seeks Russia Role in Kosovo Talks,’’ Balkan Insight, Dec. 20, 2017.
493 U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Serbia provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017.
494 ‘‘Serbia Takes Delivery of First of Six MiG-29 Fighters from Russia,’’ Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, Oct. 2, 2017; Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, P.L. No. 115-44, § 231 (Enacted Aug. 2, 2017).
495 Vincent L. Morelli, ‘‘Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ Congressional Research Service, Oct. 16, 2017. 496Kaitlin Lavinder, ‘‘Russia Ramps Up Media and Military Influence in the Balkans,’’ The Cipher Brief, Oct. 13, 2017497 Morelli, ‘‘Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018 (May 23, 2017).
496Kaitlin Lavinder, ‘‘Russia Ramps Up Media and Military Influence in the Balkans,’’ The Cipher Brief, Oct. 13, 2017
497 Morelli, ‘‘Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018 (May 23, 2017).
498 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, P.L. No. 115-44, § 254 (Enacted Aug. 2, 2017).
499 U.S. Department of State, Background Information on Belgrade provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017. 500 U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Presidential and Secretaries Travel Abroad: Jimmy Carter (1980).